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Primetime Dispute Resolution: Reality TV Mediation Shows in China’s “Harmonious 
Society” 
                                                  
Abstract 
Through a case study of reality TV mediation shows, this paper joins the debate about the recent 
promotion of formal and informal mediation by the Chinese government, what some scholars 
have called a “turn against law” (Minzner 2011). We identify three converging reasons for the 
sudden popularity of mediation shows on Chinese primetime television: (1) the desire of TV 
producers to commercially exploit interpersonal conflicts without fanning the flames of social 
instability; (2) the demands of official censors for TV programming promoting a “harmonious 
society”; and (3) the requirement for courts and other government institutions to publicly 
demonstrate their support for mediation as the most “appropriate” method for resolving 
interpersonal and neighbourhood disputes. Cases drawn from two top-rated mediation shows 
demonstrate how they privilege morality and “human feeling” (ganqing) over narrow application 
of the law. Such shows could be viewed merely as a form of propaganda, what Nader (1993) has 
called a “harmony ideology” – an attempt by the government to suppress the legitimate 
expression of social conflict. Yet while recognizing that further political, social and legal reforms 
are necessary to address the root causes of social conflict in China, we conclude that TV 
mediation shows can help to educate viewers about the benefits and drawbacks of mediation for 





Over three decades have passed since China entered the post-socialist reform era. While 
economic progress has greatly improved the material lives of many people, the economic 
reforms and consequent decline in socialist institutions have also caused enormous upheaval and 
disruption of the social fabric. There has been a significant increase in social conflict, inequality, 
and class stratification. The decline in traditional forms of social belonging, such as work units, 
active membership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and other social and political 
organizations like neighbourhood committees, and a corresponding increase in social isolation 
and the spread of individualism, together with labor mobilization and urbanization, have raised 
major concerns about collapsing social networks and a decline in civic virtue (Sun & Guo 2012: 
1-2). How to rebuild and strengthen the social fabric against these threats is a crucial issue facing 
both the Chinese government, desperate to maintain social stability and its hold on power, and 
Chinese citizens who wish to form a civic society in a more dispersed, less tightly state-
controlled, world. 
Since around 2005, the government’s response to the increasing domestic conflicts and 
social instability arising from these rapid social changes has been to emphasize the need for 
“harmony.”1 The CCP’s imperative to promote a “harmonious society” has exerted particular 
influence in two areas: first, the legal system and the resolution of disputes more broadly, where 
                                                          
1 Hu Jintao launched the “harmonious society” campaign in a speech to the Central Party School 
in February 2005: see Peoples Daily 2005. 
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the government has reaffirmed its belief in the “traditional Chinese” cultural ideal of mediation 
rather than adversarial litigation. This “new” policy approach culminated in the PRC People’s 
Mediation Law in 2010, but it has been ongoing for several years within the Chinese court 
system, as we will discuss below. Second, the “harmonious society” campaign has strongly 
impacted the Chinese media, especially the content and genres of Chinese television programs. 
Several controversial shows that allegedly fomented unorthodox values and social instability 
have been censored in recent years, and television stations must desperately search for ways to 
promote the government’s ideal of “harmony” while still maintaining audience ratings and 
increasing their profits. One method of satisfying these differing demands has been to produce 
reality TV mediation shows.  
When the first of these TV mediation shows, “The New Family Mediator” (Xin 
laoniangjiu), started broadcasting in early 2008 on Shanghai Dragon Satellite TV, its “people’s 
mediators” (renmin tiaojieyuan) quickly established a reputation for helping ordinary Shanghai 
citizens out of their interpersonal disputes using a mix of earthy wisdom, moral persuasion, and 
basic legal knowledge. The popularity of this show soon led to many imitations among other TV 
stations, and over three dozen similar reality TV mediation shows have sprung up since. Some of 
these shows may be merely using the guise of mediation to exploit sensationalistic interpersonal 
conflicts and raise their ratings. Yet their “infotainment” approach has apparently managed to 
find a niche that complies with government censors’ demands for promoting “harmony” while at 
the same time broadly appealing to TV audiences. By early 2010, when Jiangxi Satellite TV 
station started its brand show “Gold Medal Mediation” (Jinpai tiaojie), reality TV mediation had 
morphed into a semi-formal alternative dispute resolution forum endorsed by the local bureau of 
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justice and viewed by the CCP’s propaganda department as an important tool for promoting 
“social harmony” (Zhu 2011). 
These emergent TV mediation shows are not just a new manifestation of the longstanding 
role of TV and media in socialist societies as “supervisors of misconduct and wrongdoing” 
(Liebman 2011: 169), but also provide an excellent case study of the impact of the popular media 
on China’s still relatively underdeveloped legal culture. Furthermore, these highly popular shows 
raise the broader theoretical issue of the effectiveness of mediation in practice.  
The debate over the merits and defects of mediation and adjudication in the Chinese 
context has engaged scholars of Chinese law such as Evan Minzner, Randall Peerenboom and 
Xin He, as outlined below. Yet this debate can be placed within a wider ongoing controversy 
about alternative dispute resolution. In other words, should we view Chinese television 
mediation, and the push for dispute settlement outside courts more broadly, as another example 
of what Laura Nader has criticized as “harmony ideology” – where there is an “intolerance for 
conflict” in a society, and an “intention to prevent the expression of discord rather than to deal 
with its cause” (Nader 1993: 285; cf. Nader 1990)? Does television mediation in China share 
some of the other perceived defects of mediation and “informal justice” (Abel 1982) as a forum 
where “important social and legal conflict is muted, significant public matters are privatized, … 
power imbalances skew results and disempower the already subordinated … and the mediation 
process encourages unjust compromises of principles or rights that require sharp demarcations 
and enforcement”? (Menkel-Meadow 2001: xv) 
Or does mediation instead offer a highly effective, or superior, alternative forum for 
ordinary citizens whose disputes cannot be fairly resolved by the Chinese courts based purely on 
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legal adjudication? As a vocal supporter of mediation, Carrie Menkel-Meadow argues, “If the 
goal is to maximize joint gain, or at least improve the social conditions for those worst off, then 
we will need all the tools and all the strategies that are likely to help. … The outcomes reached 
by facilitated negotiation and consent, rather than externally imposed decisions, are widely 
thought to lead to greater satisfaction, legitimacy, implementability, and voluntary compliance” 
(Menkel-Meadow 2002: 50, 53, 57).  
In the following pages, we will first outline the reasons for the renewed Chinese 
government interest in mediation over the past decade, and introduce some of the criticisms and 
defenses by legal scholars of this apparent “turn against law” (Minzner 2011). Next we will 
explain the sudden emergence of reality TV mediation shows on Chinese television by placing 
them within the broader context of the controversial growth of reality TV in China – a 
phenomenon that involves various social and political agents pursuing their own, sometimes 
conflicting, agendas. We will analyse the legal and moral discourse of TV mediation through a 
representative reality show “The New Family Mediator,” demonstrating how TV mediation 
mixes legal education and application, expert commentary, moral persuasion and entertainment 
in a way that brings TV stations in line with official cultural policies, yet without sacrificing the 
commercial interests of their producers. Finally, we will examine the most recent developments 
and emerging trends of TV mediation shows since the promulgation of the People’s Mediation 
Law in 2010, focusing especially on the recent hit show “Gold Medal Mediation.”  
We conclude the paper by suggesting that these TV mediation shows exemplify the 
complexities and contradictions of the Chinese legal and dispute resolution system. It is true that 
these shows combine some of the negative features of “harmony ideology,” such as a heavy 
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focus on social stability and propaganda, and they occasionally over-emphasize the cheesy 
entertainment factor in the interests of boosting ratings and profit-making. But despite these 
defects, such shows do provide an effective forum for certain intractable kinds of interpersonal 
and family disputes that the court system would be ill-equipped to deal with. And when they are 
supplemented by other non-television forums like people’s mediation studios, they can act as an 
important educational tool to remind viewers that litigation may not always be the best or most 
cost effective method to resolve their disputes. 
 
Recent Official Promotion of Mediation to Address Emerging Social Disputes 
Chinese courts and the legal system have been strongly impacted by the perceived rise in 
social instability over the past decade and the CCP’s consequent focus on “harmony.” Since the 
late 1970s, the government had engaged in a major effort to build a modern legal system, 
including passing thousands of new statutes covering all areas of civil and criminal law, court 
procedure, and the qualifications and duties of lawyers and judges (Peerenboom 2002). This 
rebuilding was necessary because, during the Maoist period (1949-76), formal trials and 
adjudication by impartial judges had been regularly criticized as biased in favour of the 
exploiting classes, and most civil disputes had to be resolved through mediation in courts or by 
so-called people’s mediation committees rather than through adversarial litigation (Huang 2010: 
200-3). Indeed, during the Cultural Revolution all courts were shut down and many judges and 
lawyers faced persecution for their so-called bourgeois liberalization tendencies (Lubman 1999: 
ch.3-4). This situation changed dramatically during the 1980s and 1990s, with the revived 
People’s Court system becoming gradually more professionalized, and increasing proportions of 
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legal disputes being decided through formal adjudication rather than mediation (Peerenboom 
2002: 57-8; Fu and Cullen 2007: 10-12).  
Popular media were at least partly responsible for the growing awareness of law and the 
consequent increase in litigation, especially during the 1990s. The Chinese government engaged 
in a huge publicity campaign to promote the benefits of a modern, predictable and fair “rule of 
law” society as opposed to the capricious, unstable and frequently unjust “rule of man” society of 
the Maoist period (Lubman 1999 ch.7; Peerenboom 2002 ch.3). From legal literature to legal 
education programs on television and radio, the popular media played an important role in 
spreading ideas and information about the law (Kinkley 2000). Yet the preference for litigation 
was also due to changes in judges’ incentive systems, which encouraged them to carry out formal 
adjudication rather than mediate as previously (Minzner 2011: 957).  
With all this institutional, political, and media support, litigation rates increased 
dramatically – despite the alleged traditional Chinese cultural aversion to lawsuits – so much so 
that by 2002 the annual numbers of civil lawsuits had risen to some 3.5 million cases, compared 
with just over 300,000 in 1978 (Peerenboom & He 2008: 5). By contrast, while mediation still 
remained a regular part of the formal trial process, the number of court cases settled by 
mediation shrank from around 70% in 1989 to only about 30% in 2004 (Fu and Cullen 2007: 53). 
Having said this, as Philip C.C. Huang observes, informal, community-based mediation outside 
courts continued to be a central method of dispute resolution throughout the reform period 
(Huang 2010: 51-2). 
However, the very success of these legal reform efforts and the government’s promotion 
of legal awareness among the broader population came at a cost. One major problem was how to 
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train and resource sufficient numbers of judges to staff all the new courts to deal with the huge 
numbers of legal disputes, especially civil and family lawsuits (Fu and Cullen 2007, 21-25). 
Even as recently as the early 2000s, many courts, especially in remote or rural areas, continued 
to be staffed by judges without formal legal training, and this included not just lower level judges 
but local court presidents, who in many cases had been transferred from military or Party 
positions as if the courts were simply another arm of the local government. Courts lacked 
independence from local governments, with appointments and salaries being controlled at the 
same level of government as the court, a situation that led to frequent interference with judges’ 
decisions in cases involving local political interests. And judges’ salaries remained low, which 
tempted many of them to accept bribes and other gifts from disputing parties (Hawes 2006).  
The result of these widespread endemic problems was an increase in popular 
dissatisfaction with court judgments and resistance to the enforcement of judgments, especially 
in rural areas and small towns. This, in turn, led to a dramatic increase in the numbers of 
disputants seeking redress through extra-legal methods including demonstrations and violent 
confrontations, as well as media and internet publicity campaigns (O’Brien and Li 2006). There 
was also a massive rise in rural or small town disputants going directly to Beijing and other 
major cities to appeal to government officials and ministries: the so-called “letters and visits” 
(xinfang) system (Minzner 2006).  
The sheer numbers of large-scale popular demonstrations and aggrieved citizens 
descending on the capital accompanied by regular negative media attention convinced the CCP 
(rightly or wrongly) that something was seriously wrong with the established legal mechanisms 
for dealing with disputes. By the early 2000s, Party leaders had concluded that litigation in the 
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courts was no longer an effective method for resolving many kinds of social disputes, 
particularly those resulting from the “growing pains” of economic reforms, such as land claims, 
labour relations disputes and domestic or family quarrels (Peerenboom & He 2008: 13; Minzner 
2011: 947). Therefore, besides starting a propaganda campaign to promote a harmonious society 
and introducing policies to reduce discrimination against rural citizens and migrant workers, the 
Party also demanded reforms to the legal system.  
Starting from around 2002, the Supreme People’s Court (“SPC”) began to re-emphasize 
the necessity for judges to mediate cases, rather than formally adjudicating them (Hand 2011: 
133; Xiong 2006: 97). Over the next decade, the SPC published three opinions underscoring the 
benefits of mediated settlement both within and outside courts (SPC 2004; 2007; 2010). For 
example, its 2007 opinion stated: “The fundamental tasks of the people’s courts include 
resolving contradictions in society, upholding social stability, supporting economic development, 
promoting social harmony, and realizing justice and equity … The people’s courts must act as 
both a constructive force in building a harmonious society, and a protective force maintaining 
that harmonious society … [To this end] they must increase the proportion of lawsuits that are 
resolved through [court] mediation, … and strengthen their efforts to guide the people’s 
mediation committees” (SPC 2007: arts.1 & 20).  
Many courts subsequently altered their incentive systems to financially reward judges for 
increasing their mediated settlement rates. And the propaganda system went into overdrive to 




The government also made concerted efforts to revive mediation practices outside the 
courts. The people’s mediation committees that had begun to fade away during the 1990s sprang 
to life again, now better funded and staffed by better educated, less political mediators who 
blended law with psychology, moral/social pressure, and dogged persuasion to resolve a range of 
typical disputes that arise in local communities (Xiong 2006: 99; Read & Michelson 2008, 742). 
Senior government leaders also urged local governments to coordinate with courts and 
people’s mediators in what they called “grand mediation” (da tiaojie), in order to deal with major 
intractable disputes between ordinary citizens and government institutions or state-controlled 
enterprises. Typical examples included collective disputes involving land expropriation, labor 
and environmental disputes, and conflicts involving socioeconomic rights or entitlements such as 
pensions and medical/welfare claims (Hu 2011: 1075, 1080). Grand mediation involves 
grassroots government officials identifying potential large-scale disputes before they escalate 
into mass petitions and popular demonstrations, then working with the aggrieved parties, 
defendants, local courts and Party-state institutions to find a workable compromise and defuse 
the tension (Hu 2011: 1072-6; Hand 2011: 143-7; Xiong 2006). 
This promotion of mediation outside the courts was given even stronger institutional 
support with the passing of the PRC People’s Mediation Law in 2010, which sets out the 
requirements for establishing mediation committees and the procedures for engaging in 
mediation activities and drafting mediation agreements, and perhaps most importantly, requires 
local governments to provide adequate funding for the work of mediation committees (Xinhua 
2010). The purpose of the new law was clearly stated by Wu Aiying, the Chinese Minister of 
Justice: “While China is experiencing profound social and economic changes, various kinds of 
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social conflicts are also emerging. ... Mediation should be the first line of defence to maintain 
social stability and promote harmony” (Liang 2010). 
 
Debates About Mediation in China 
Some legal scholars have criticized the Chinese government’s recent campaign to 
promote mediation over legal adjudication. Evan Minzner, for example, argues that promoting 
mediation undermines the still underdeveloped legal system by taking disputes that should be 
resolved consistently according to predictable legal principles, with clear winners and losers, and 
instead pressurizing the parties to agree to settlements based on vague moral principles and 
policies that are not part of the written law. Referring to official efforts to increase mediation in 
Chinese courts, he claims that the authorities “are forcing individual parties to make concessions 
in closed-door proceedings as a means of addressing cases that attract significant social attention 
or that generate petitions by disgruntled parties. If civil and administrative dispute resolution 
norms simply devolve to oiling the loudest and squeakiest wheel in every case, what is left of the 
Chinese legal system?” (Minzner 2011, 961)  
While it is true that some kinds of disputes may not be suited to mediation and should 
instead be adjudicated by judges based on clear legal principles, there are also huge numbers of 
disputes that involve family members or neighbours living in the same community. In other 
words, they are between people who must continue to interact with each other on a regular basis 
after the dispute is resolved. These are precisely the kinds of disputes that the legal system and 
the courts in formal adjudication are ill-equipped to deal with, because they involve long and 
sometimes complex histories behind the dispute, or they result from contradictions between the 
13 
 
law and past government policies, and they cannot easily be sorted out by simply following the 
letter of the law (Peerenboom & He 2008: 15; Fu 2010: 179-81). A purely legal solution would 
only lead to injustice for one of the disputing parties, and possibly further escalation of the 
conflict.  
In addition, poorer members of society doubtless could not afford to go to court or hire a 
lawyer in the first place. These are precisely the kinds of people who might otherwise be 
provoked into directly seeking help from government officials through letters and visits, or 
taking to the streets in social protests (Peerenboom & He 2008: 15-16). By contrast, mediators 
are not permitted to charge fees to the disputants for the services they provide (People’s 
Mediation Law 2010: art.4).  
Another common criticism of mediation is that it is not suitable for disputes where there 
is a clear power imbalance between the parties. In these cases, court adjudication is said to be 
more effective at overcoming the disparities and producing a fairer outcome for the weaker party 
(Fiss 1984:1076-8; Minzner 2011: 959-60; contra Menkel-Meadow 1995:2687-8). In China, the 
kinds of cases that the SPC urges courts to resolve through mediation specifically include those 
that: “(1) involve difficult, complex, or collective disputes; (2) require the cooperation of 
government organs; (3) influence social harmony and stability; (4) involve legal rules that are 
unclear, difficult to apply, or may be difficult to enforce; (5) involve sensitive issues common 
concern to society; or (6) involve extreme emotions” (Hand 2011: 134-5, citing SPC 2010: art.4). 
At first sight, it appears that the very cases that should be resolved through adjudication are 
being channeled towards mediation instead. This echoes one of Abel’s main explanations for the 
rise of informal justice elsewhere: “The state … is seeking … to defuse protest… Aware that its 
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repressive resources are limited, [the state] regroups its forces and concentrates them on the 
primary loci of dissent, using less expensive, less coercive methods of control” (Abel 1982: 3-4). 
But as Wu (2013) and others have pointed out, a problem specific to China is that the 
courts are in a relatively weak position in the political hierarchy, and they do not have the 
authority to enforce their judgments against powerful state institution defendants or state-
controlled corporations supported by local CCP committees. Political reforms to correct this 
situation do not appear to be on the horizon. As a result, simple adjudication is not the best way 
to resolve such disputes in China, and that is why they so often escalate into social disturbances 
and instability. While “grand mediation” has been criticized as a top-down, government-initiated 
process that takes away the flexibility of forum choice from ordinary citizens (Hu 2011: 1082-3, 
1086-7), in these complex multiparty disputes, it does at least bring all the involved parties 
together and allow some political pressure to be exerted on the more powerful entities that court 
orders normally could not reach (ibid.: 1088). 
Finally, we should point out that despite the government’s emphasis on mediation, the 
number of civil lawsuits appears to be still rising, reaching over 6.5 million cases in 2011, as 
compared with 3.5 million in 2002 (Supreme People’s Court 2012). These figures do not indicate 
any drastic turn away from law.2 
                                                          
2 True, the SPC’s 2013 Work Report to the National People’s Congress (SPC 2013: section 4) 
claims that 64.6% of these cases were either resolved by mediation or otherwise settled before 
trial, but that still leaves approximately 2.3 million that were presumably adjudicated. 
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Clearly, the situation in China is highly complex, and as Menkel-Meadow (2002: 50) 
would put it, requires “all the tools and all the strategies that are likely to help” in resolving 
disputes. One such strategy that has emerged in recent years is reality TV mediation. 
 
Reality Television, Social (In)stability, and the Emergence of TV Mediation Shows in 
China 
Despite the recent explosive growth of the internet, television still maintains a dominant 
position as a revenue generator in the mass media and entertainment industry in China. With 287 
television stations and 2262 broadcast channels (Miao 2011: 91-2), total advertising revenues 
from Chinese television reached 675.82 billion yuan in 2009, compared with just 19.3 billion 
yuan from the internet. And while the national flagship station China Central Television (CCTV) 
received a quarter of the total advertising revenues, provincial TV stations have been among the 
fastest growing players in the market, especially since they established satellite channels (shengji 
weishi) over the last decade (Xinhua 2011).   
This growth in provincial TV stations reflects a decade-long process of opening up 
television to marketization and competition since the late 1990s. Though CCTV still holds a 
partial monopoly over certain kinds of programs, such as national news broadcasts, the numerous 
provincial television stations that have recently been permitted to broadcast nationwide via 
satellite are now starting to vie for national market share through other genres. An effective 
shortcut to profitability and audience ratings has been to produce more entertainment-oriented 
shows and develop niche markets that cater to audiences’ differing needs.  
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In particular, the genre that came to dominate primetime broadcasts of many provincial TV 
stations was reality talk shows. These so-called “shows of human emotions” (qinggan jiemu) 
more often than not focused on situations of domestic chaos and relationship turmoil, including 
extramarital affairs, tension with in-laws, disputes about parental responsibilities or child rearing, 
generational conflicts, family property disputes, ugly divorces or “abnormal” relationships (Miao 
2011). In other words, the commercialized Chinese media, like that of media elsewhere, were 
keen to exploit audiences’ voyeuristic fascination for sensational stories and airing peoples’ dirty 
laundry in public.   
Yet one of the biggest dilemmas Chinese TV stations still face is the continuing ambiguity 
of their identity, as part commercial businesses and part public enterprises, which has its roots in 
the broader contradictions of “socialism with Chinese characteristics.”  While TV 
commercialization is generally encouraged by the current regime, the fact that all mainland TV 
stations are still effectively owned and supervised by the state means they can never be operated 
completely as commercial concerns. Even what appears to be non-political, entertainment-
oriented programming may face criticism by the State Administration for Radio, Film and 
Television (SARFT) for going against state policies and “socialist morality.”  
Not only is the content of TV shows censored, but also many other operational affairs need 
the approval of SARFT. For example, in December 2008, SARFT issued an order criticizing the 
“vulgarization of television shows on human feelings”, including those focusing on “bitter 
emotions, unusual relationships and extramarital affairs,” which the government blamed for their 
negative influence on viewers and their impact on social stability. SARFT’s notice required 
shows dealing with emotional life and family relationships to adopt a more positive attitude 
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(Dongfang zaobao 2009). More recently, in October 2011, SARFT released a new directive, the 
“Opinion on Strengthening the Management of Programs Broadcast on Satellite Television 
Channels,” imposing strict new regulations on the entertainment shows that Chinese satellite TV 
stations are allowed to broadcast, including limiting the number of “entertainment” shows during 
primetime hours, and requiring that each TV station produce an “ethics building” program to 
fulfil its social responsibility role (SARFT 2011).  
For television producers, social instability and the current moral uncertainty in society can 
create many tempting opportunities for exploiting sensational stories. At the same time, how to 
exploit these stories is a thorny issue that they must address with great caution. In order to 
succeed, they must keep one eye fixed on the censors and another eye fixed on the market. In this 
context, reality TV mediation shows are an ingenious solution that allows them to comply with 
the dual demands of providing both “social benefits” to viewers and “economic benefits” to 
themselves.  
Chinese TV mediation shows started in 2008 with “The New Family Mediator” (hereafter 
NFM): a show that itself resulted from the structural changes and necessary program adjustments 
of a local TV station, Shanghai Dragon Satellite TV (Shanghai Dongfang weishi).3 This newly 
                                                          
3 In the early 2000s, Dragon TV developed two highly popular offerings in the newly imported 
talent show genre, “My Style My Show” (Woxing woxiu, 2004-2009) and “Happy Boy’s Voice” 
(Kuaile nansheng, 2006-2007). Like several other Chinese talent shows, both were eventually 
terminated for their “immoral” content, due to pressure from SARFT. Its new “infotainment” 
shows such as NFM and “Magic Cube of Happiness” (Xingfu mofang), a psychological advice 
show, were attempts to fill the gap left by the banned talent shows (Baidu 2012). Many Chinese 
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developed dispute resolution reality show included many of the same kinds of social and family 
conflicts that were a staple of previous reality TV shows, and thus satisfied audiences’ 
voyeuristic demands for “a world of emotion”; but by resolving the various disputes using 
professionally respectable mediation techniques, it also paid lip service to the official 
requirement to promote a “harmonious society.”  This kind of show exemplifies the hybrid 
“infotainment” approach that many other TV stations in China have also adopted.  
To demonstrate how TV mediation shows fulfil the demands of various social agents, 
ranging from TV producers to courts, CCP officials and TV audiences, and how they present a 
sometimes incongruous combination of law, morality, entertainment and politics, we will now 
analyse NFM in more detail.  
 
The New Family Mediator: Reality TV Packing a Moral Punch 
The term laoniangjiu (which we translate family mediator, but literally means ‘old uncle’) 
is a folk dialect word from the Shanghai region which traditionally referred to senior and 
respected family members who played the role of mediators when family disputes and 
neighbourhood conflicts arose. With the rapid urbanization and disintegration of traditional 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
reality TV shows are based on imported foreign (especially European and US) formats, such as 
“Voice of China” (Zhongguo haoshengyin: Zhejiang TV) based on The Voice (a multinational 
show originating in the Netherlands), and “If You Are The One” (Feicheng wurao: Jiangsu TV), 
based on the UK show Take Me Out! However, I have not managed to locate any foreign models 
for Chinese TV mediation shows. 
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family structures and neighbourhood relationships, one might imagine that this term would have 
become obsolete. However, the concept of laoniangjiu has been redefined over the last decade, 
mainly due to the influence of the popular media and the government’s re-emphasis on mediation 
as a dispute resolution technique.  
NFM was named after a popular sitcom called “The Family Mediator” (Lao niangjiu) 
which ran for thirteen years on Dragon TV from the mid-1990s onwards. But in contrast to its 
sitcom predecessor, where the family mediator was clearly a fictional character and 
entertainment was the dominant motive, NFM is a reality show, and its laoniangjiu were selected 
from real “people’s mediators” working in Shanghai’s neighbourhood committees. The show 
also burnished its official credentials by directly collaborating with the local government’s 
Bureau of Justice (sifa ju), and the TV set was arranged like a mediation room in a court, with 
disputants on each side and the mediator seated in the centre. Real disputes from neighbourhood 
committees all over Shanghai were selected to be resolved on the show. 
The typical format of a 40-minute NFM show is as follows. The disputing parties are 
invited by the female host into the mediation room (TV studio) to sit facing each other, often 
partly disguising their identities with hats, masks and sunglasses. Each party recounts their side 
of the dispute to the mediator, while viewers watch on their TV screens. After listening carefully 
to each side, the mediator steps in and negotiates a settlement between the parties using a mix of 
legal arguments, moral persuasion, and sheer force of personality. 
Though NFM is a reality TV show, obviously the final product seen by viewers differs 
from real life mediation in several ways. The mediation session is edited to fit into one or two 
thirty-minute episodes. Although the more complex situations are given sixty minutes of air time, 
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it is obvious from regular voiceovers and edited clips of backroom negotiation sessions that the 
parties spent much longer working through their disputes, and we are only seeing a truncated 
version. In their choice of material, the producers purposely build excitement and suspense: they 
highlight and repeat heated arguments between the parties, insert cliff-hangers before 
commercials, and encourage spontaneous face-to-face advice from the mediators and expert 
consultants and even direct moral criticisms from audience members via call-in phone lines. 
Occasionally they send reporters on location to investigate the true facts. Thus, although there is 
little doubt that the people are real and their disputes are real, the show does have the feel of a 
moralistic entertainment spectacle, and it occasionally blurs the lines between reality and 
dramatic representation, not unlike many American court TV shows.4 
The most common topics on the show are family disputes, especially those between 
husbands and wives (usually involving suspected extramarital affairs, financial issues, or child-
rearing disputes), and between parents and their grown-up children. For example, our survey of 
three months of NFM episodes from July 1 to September 30, 2012, included a total of 45 
different cases (some cases are resolved in one episode, and others are spread over two episodes). 
Of these, 37 cases dealt with marriage disputes, and 18 cases dealt with disputes between parents 
and their grown-up children (some of these overlap with the first category, as parents often 
interfere with their children’s marriage decisions). However, many of these family disputes 
revolve around the unfairness of property distribution among family members, as is clear from 
the examples given below. In our sample, we found 9 out of 45 cases directly involved property 
                                                          
4 Compare the interesting studies of representation on the American court TV shows Judge Judy, 
Judge Joe Brown and The People’s Court by Kohm 2006; and Wilson & Ackerman 2012. 
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disputes, and several others were arguably caused by large families having to live together in the 
same cramped apartment due to their inability to afford adequate housing. Other less frequent 
topics included gambling debts or investment scams (4), elder abuse (1), and drug addiction (1). 
As for the socioeconomic backgrounds of the participants on NFM, although jobs and 
qualifications are not explicitly mentioned on the show, it is clear from the context of the 
disputes and the parties’ speech and behavior that they are virtually all urban workers, laid-off 
employees, poor seniors, or migrant workers living temporarily in Shanghai – in other words, 
people from lower socioeconomic levels.5  
NFM captured the imaginations and interest of Shanghai audiences, and it soon jumped 
to the top of the ratings among Shanghai TV shows. Its success was largely due to the skill of 
one of its mediators, Bai Wanqing. A former Party official from the neighbourhood committee of 
Jing’an District in charge of propaganda/organizational work and seniors’ issues, Bai started off 
as just one of several people’s mediators who took turns appearing on the show. She stood out 
with her quick but penetrating judgments, her no-nonsense attitude, and her authoritative yet 
amiable personality. The show increasingly featured her as the main mediator and she soon 
became an unlikely TV star. To demonstrate Bai Wanqing’s approach to disputes and the 
broader discourse of TV mediation represented by NFM, we will analyse two domestic dispute 
cases from the show involving the pressing current issue of residential property ownership. 
Shanghai has long been notorious for its high cost of living and poor housing conditions, 
and it is common for several generations of a family to share a single cramped apartment. This 
                                                          
5 Bai Wanqing also notes that virtually all the participants on NFM are poor: see Bai 2010b. 
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already serious situation has been exacerbated by major policy changes and social restructuring 
over the past decades. A particularly thorny issue has been the return of sent-down youth and 
their families from rural areas since the late 1970s, which brought up a whole set of legal and 
social problems relating to registration re-settlement and property ownership. More recently, 
housing reform and the demolition of residential houses, together with the arrival of a massive 
floating population, many of whom are in fact educated professionals from other cities, 
foreigners, and overseas Chinese from Taiwan and Hong Kong, have led to massive 
development of the metropolis. The result has been a rapid spike in real estate prices, and a 
tendency for local people to become obsessed with the issue of finding a decent place to live.  
Housing disputes are frequently interwoven with issues relating to parental support, the 
household registration system (hukou), disputes with in-laws, inheritance and estates, and other 
longstanding grievances. To mediate housing and property disputes, one not only has to be aware 
of traditional Chinese values and moral beliefs about family relationships, but also to be familiar 
with the historical and policy changes that have led to the current housing problem in the first 
place, as well as the relevant laws and regulations that cover the area of the dispute. 
 
Battling Brothers 
On its 7 November 2010 episode, NFM featured a dispute between two brothers who shared a 
two-bedroom apartment left to them by their deceased parents.6 In this family with five grown-
                                                          
6 Episodes were viewed by the authors online using the archives of NFM available on the video 
syndication website Youku: http://www.youku.com/. 
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up children, the third son, who was divorced with custody of his daughter, lived with the parents 
in Shanghai, and had contributed a substantial sum when the apartment was first purchased by 
the parents in 2000. The eldest son, a sent-down youth in the Cultural Revolution, had moved to 
a town in Zhejiang province with his second wife, but in 2001 he lost his job when his employer, 
a state-owned company, closed down. His family soon broke up – his wife left him and took 
their daughter with her.  Realizing that his elder brother was on the verge of a mental breakdown, 
the fourth son brought him back to Shanghai and arranged for him to stay with the parents and 
the third son. After the parents died in quick succession, legal ownership of the two-bedroom 
apartment was divided equally among the five children, but seeing the two brothers’ difficult 
situation, the other children decided not to sell, allowing the two brothers to continue to stay 
there. However, the living arrangements and domestic dynamics in this shared space changed 
when the new girlfriend of the third son moved in with her teenage daughter. Soon the couple 
used the excuse of renovating the apartment for their upcoming wedding to throw out the 
belongings of the eldest son. When the eldest son persisted in coming back to sleep there, it led 
to physical altercations and even police intervention. In fact, one of the rooms that the eldest son 
used was so badly damaged by his brother that it became uninhabitable.  
The mediator Bai Wanqing, after hearing the stories told by the two sides, wasted no time 
in bluntly telling the third son and his girlfriend that they were wrong to try and force the eldest 
son to move out: “You don’t have the right to do this, because you don’t have ownership of the 
property (suoyou quan).” She then clearly stated the legal situation: “What your parents gave you 
is the right to use the property (shiyong quan), but the name on the real estate certificate is that of 
your parents. And now [since the parents have died], even your right to use the place is just a 
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generous gift from your other siblings.” In this way, Bai immediately showed the disputing 
parties how a court would look at the situation if it was a lawsuit.  
The offending couple were obviously shocked by her conclusion but apparently still not 
convinced enough to agree to a reasonable settlement. Seeing this, the show’s host, Yang Lei, 
opened up the viewer call-in line and allowed three viewers to express their “public opinions.” 
They all sympathized with the eldest son and criticized the third son for forgetting the “value of 
family” and “brotherly love.”  By this time, the aggressive couple looked defeated and much 
more willing to compromise in order to settle the dispute.  
Bai then proposed two solutions: one was to sell the property and divide the proceeds 
among the five siblings, which was the formal legal option. The other was to maintain the 
previous arrangement whereby the two would share the apartment, with the third son’s family 
staying in the larger room and the eldest son in the smaller room. The third son, realizing his 
disadvantageous legal position, preferred the latter solution, but the eldest son insisted on selling 
the apartment. Surprisingly, Bai then made it clear that she supported them keeping the 
apartment rather than selling it. She appealed to the principle of “family feeling” (qinqing): 
“Don’t sacrifice family feelings for your individual interest.” She reminded the eldest son that if 
the apartment were sold, the third son, as a low income worker, could not afford to buy or even 
rent another place in Shanghai, due to the high living costs there, and the third son and his family 
would have to migrate somewhere else. She then repeated the moral exhortations of the call-in 
viewers, praising the other siblings for their generosity in dealing with their parents’ inheritance, 
and reminding the eldest son once again that “qinqing is more important than individual 
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interest.” Eventually the eldest son accepted this compromise, or “middle way,” arrangement, 
and the episode concluded with the two brothers reluctantly shaking hands.  
In a commentary on this case in the Shanghai Legal News column “Legal Weekend,” a 
lawyer Sun Honglin pointed out that “mediation does more than provide legal adjudication.” He 
particularly praised the strategy Bai used in this mediation, that is, to make the third son realize 
his errors using both legal and moral education, and to make him feel guilty about what he had 
done; and then to appeal to “family feelings” to influence the eldest son to calm his hostility: 
“The mediator should exert a positive psychological influence on the parties and guide their 
emotions so they will accept some compromise solution that will satisfy both sides” (Sun 2010).  
A similar argument appears in an editorial in Procuratorial Views (Jiancha fengyun), the 
flagship publication of the Chinese People’s Procuracy. The author states that compared with 
court methods (including both litigation and court mediation), which often end up damaging 
family relationships even when the judicial decision complies with the law, family mediators 
such as Bai Wanqing offer an alternative solution: “The brilliance of Bai the family mediator lies 
in her use not only of the sword of law but also the softer weapons of moral suasion and appeals 
to emotion . . .  She makes us realize that our nation and our society have a great sense of love 
based on traditions going back thousands of years of helping the old, the young, the weak, and 
the poor” (Jiancha fengyun 2010). 
Bai’s own summary of the principles she follows seems to confirm the argument of this 
editorial. She states that mediation must follow “three bottom lines”: the first is the moral line; 
the second is the (government) policy line; and the third is the legal line (Bai 2010d). She 
particularly emphasizes that NFM will never become a tool for those who seek to satisfy purely 
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personal or individual interests. This last point is a direct comment on the motives of some of 
those who come onto the show. With NFM’s growing reputation, many parties may see it as a 
highly efficient way to get their disputes resolved free of charge, especially if they can enlist 
public opinion to “defeat” the other side. Yet both the above case and the one that follows should 
deliver a salutary warning to those seeking to satisfy purely “individual interests” by coming 
onto the show. 
 
 
The Suffering Step-Grandmother 
Bai Wanqing’s mediation notes, published in Shanghai Legal News and Xinmin Daily 
News, summarize disputes that have already appeared on NFM, but they also include Bai’s 
explanations justifying her approach to each case, hence they are a valuable resource for 
analysing the discourse of the show (Bai 2009). Our second case comes from one of these notes 
recounting another property dispute (Bai 2010c).  
Bai first summarizes the facts of the dispute, which are quite complicated: Mrs. Zhang 
lives with her step-granddaughter in a one-bedroom apartment left to Mrs. Zhang by her husband 
Mr. Zhang. The granddaughter is the child of Ms. Yang, a daughter that Mr. Zhang had with a 
second wife. Mrs. Zhang is now under severe financial pressure due to her high medical costs 
and low pension, so she is planning to sell her apartment, but the step-granddaughter has refused 
to sign the transfer forms. Chinese law requires that co-habitants of a property must consent 
before the property can be sold. But Mrs. Zhang now claims that the registered residence of the 
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step-granddaughter in Shanghai is invalid because she is not actually the child of a sent-down 
youth, and therefore she should not have benefited from the government’s resettlement policy 
after the Cultural Revolution. Mrs. Zhang claims that although the girl’s mother, Ms. Yang, did 
move to Jiaxing (in Zhejiang Province) in 1969, during the Cultural Revolution, she was not 
being sent down but merely following her birth parents who had migrated voluntarily from 
Shanghai in the 1950s. Clearly Mrs. Zhang is using this argument to deny her step-
granddaughter’s legal residency status in Shanghai, so that she can achieve her goal of selling the 
property without getting the step-granddaughter’s consent. Believing that this is a strong 
argument, she has taken the initiative to come onto NFM. 
Mediator Bai’s first response to this situation is to defend the government’s policy 
towards sent-down youth. She considers that the spirit of this policy was to allow all children of 
sent-down youth to resettle in the city where their parents came from. She reasons that Ms. 
Yang’s move in 1969 should be considered as part of the sent-down youth movement even if she 
was not forced to move away from Shanghai. She also points out that in 1979, when Mr. Zhang 
helped his granddaughter to resettle her residence in Shanghai, it was treated as a legally 
recognized act as it satisfied the policy that was in force at the time. If Mrs. Zhang had an 
objection to this registration, she should have raised it many years earlier instead of suddenly 
bringing it up now that she plans to sell the property. 
Bai thus makes it clear that the step-granddaughter has the legal right to use, and 
ultimately inherit, this apartment, and Mrs. Zhang certainly cannot sell it without the 
granddaughter’s consent. Besides defending the past policy of the Party-state, Bai’s 
interpretation of the situation here is obviously part of her broader tendency, revealed in many 
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other episodes of NFM, to try to protect the rights of “disadvantaged groups” in society. These 
groups include previously sent-down youths such as Ms. Yang who often suffered again as laid-
off workers in the 1990s, and their children; also migrant workers and the urban poor who have 
been identified by various levels of government as “problematic groups” left behind by the 
economic reforms and have fallen to the bottom rungs of society in the ongoing process of social 
stratification. These resourceless and downtrodden citizens have become the most frequent 
initiators of social protests, petitions and, when driven to desperation, extreme anti-social 
activities such as violent homicides and suicides (O’Brien & Li 2006; Peerenboom & He 2008). 
To pacify these groups with various forms of material and “spiritual” support has been a major 
policy initiative of the CCP over the past decade, especially at the local government level, and 
Bai understands this imperative very well. 
However, Bai explains in her note that there happens to be more than one “socially 
disadvantaged” party in this case, as Mrs. Zhang belongs to the urban elderly poor (Bai 2010c).  
She sees two possible ways to resolve the dispute: one is to sell the apartment and split the 
proceeds, which Mrs. Zhang is demanding; the other is to keep things as they are, which the 
granddaughter and Ms. Yang would prefer, because after Mrs Zhang, already in her eighties, dies, 
they will inherit the whole apartment. While both solutions have some legal basis, on the show 
Bai clearly indicated to Ms. Yang (who was there representing her daughter) that the morally 
superior approach would be to agree to the sale of the property. Bai reminded Ms. Yang that Mrs. 
Zhang looked after her when she was young (before she left Shanghai for Jiaxing). Now that Mrs. 
Zhang is ill, lonely and needs help, it would be wrong for Ms. Yang and her daughter to insist on 
Mrs. Zhang keeping the apartment when she is in desperate need of money right now. Eventually, 
swayed by this moral pressure, Ms. Yang agrees to buy out the part of the apartment that belongs 
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to Mrs. Zhang. Bai then immediately persuades Mrs. Zhang to agree on a reasonable price, as Ms. 
Yang and her husband are both laid-off workers and cannot afford to pay a high market price. In 
this way, Bai once again gets the parties to agree to a solution that “satisfies both sides” yet goes 
beyond an “unfair” legal solution based purely on individual rights.  
Clearly, legal or individual rights are not privileged at all in TV mediation, as 
exemplified by NFM. Instead, the people’s mediators, who we should not forget are mostly state 
employees, must ensure that their work helps to maintain social stability and build a 
“harmonious society.” To provide a legally-based adjudication is not necessarily the primary 
goal; rather they must attempt to achieve the more difficult task of repairing damaged social 
relationships and, in some cases, “robbing the rich to feed the poor,” thereby soothing the 
turbulent social emotions of frustration, anger and resentment among the mass of ordinary 
citizens.   
Thus, NFM combines several different models of social governance and conflict-
resolution in its mediation discourse: we see the influence of the neighbourhood committees and 
similar peoples’ institutions that typified the governance system in socialist China; also traces of 
the family mediators in traditional Chinese society based on the Confucian family and clan 
system of reciprocal relationships; and the most recent overlay of professional legal advice and 
court mediation/adjudication techniques influenced by imported liberal conceptions of individual 
legal rights and “rule of law.” 
In light of the popularity of NFM and its spin-offs, and the influential public role of TV 
mediation in carrying out social governance and legal education functions, it should be no 
surprise that Bai Wanqing has turned into a rare commodity: a popular celebrity who is also 
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strongly endorsed by the government. She has been honoured with numerous official awards and 
ranks, among them Representative of the Shanghai People’s Congress, and Public Ambassador 
for the 2010 Shanghai Expo. The director of the propaganda department of Shanghai 
Municipality also praised her “work among the people” for its multiple positive functions, 
including acting as a “psychological consultant, moral educator, legal advisor, and a channel for 
the release of popular emotions” (Bai 2010a). 
Clearly NFM exhibits many of the features of what Nader would characterize as 
“harmony ideology.” We see the downplaying of legal adjudication based on individual legal 
rights in favour of more fuzzy concepts like “family feeling” and “morality.” We also see strong 
support from government and Party institutions, which treat TV mediation shows as an excellent 
forum to publicize the value of settlement outside court, to help reduce the numbers of lawsuits 
and petitions clogging up the system, and to “defuse protests” (Abel 1982: 3) before they 
escalate into calls for political reform. And finally, we find a total absence of cases on these 
shows involving government officials or state-controlled entities as defendants. Thus, from 
watching reality TV mediation shows, one gets the impression that the vast majority of disputes 
are interpersonal issues that can be resolved through compromise, as opposed to politically-
charged issues that can only be resolved through legislative reform and the fairer distribution of 
resources in society (ibid. 6). 
At the same time, this “harmonious” ideological message is juxtaposed with the 
commercial motives of the producers, leading to some incongruous results. Perhaps most 
obvious is the natural tendency of the show’s editors to play up the conflicts between the parties 
in order to keep viewers glued to their sets. At the start of each episode, and at several points 
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during the show, the editors interrupt the flow with clips of one or both disputing parties losing 
their tempers, shouting at their family members, threatening to walk out, bursting into tears, or 
even kneeling on the ground begging the mediators for help. The repetition of these kinds of 
dramatic scenes suggests that conflict rather than harmony is the main draw of the shows, and in 
this aspect they resemble some of their banned “world of emotion” predecessors. In other words, 
the commercial imperative of television results in a mixed ideological message being given to 
viewers. 
More positively, these shows challenge the argument that mediation involves a coerced 
compromise without the procedural safeguards of an open and fair adjudication forum (Fiss 
1984:1076-8). Though most cases on NFM are resolved, there are some where the parties choose 
not to resolve their disputes in spite of all the persuasion and moral pressure exerted on them by 
the mediator and legal experts, and they are perfectly free to do so. 
Equally significant, these shows demonstrate the complexity of apparently simple 
interpersonal disputes: we find that both parties may have equally valid justifications for their 
arguments, and both may have contributed to the conflict. Viewers discover that resolving 
disputes is not a simple matter of deciding who is right and who is wrong but involves many 
difficult moral issues and social implications beyond the dispute that must be taken into account. 
We saw this in the case of Mrs. Zhang above, where both the poverty of the grandmother and the 
right of the step-granddaughter to have a place to live were equally valid considerations in the 
mediation. A purely legal adjudication would have given the granddaughter the right to refuse 
any sale of the property and left the grandmother with no money to pay her medical costs.  
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The underlying message here is far from a simplistic “harmony ideology”: rather, it 
demonstrates that the law can be a blunt tool that fails to consider the negative consequences of 
too great a focus on legal rights to the exclusion of other factors. We will return to some of these 
issues in our conclusion after tracing the further evolution of reality TV mediation shows since 
the 2010 promulgation of the People’s Mediation Law.  
 
Growth of Television Mediation in China Since 2010 
The success of NFM and Bai Wanqing’s surprising emergence as a grass-roots TV 
celebrity inspired many other provincial and municipal TV stations to jump on the mediation 
bandwagon. Similar shows sprouted all over the place, including “The Family Mediator of 
Qiantang” in Hangzhou (Qiantang Laoniangjiu), “The Sincere Female Assistant” in Jilin 
(Zhenqing nü bangban), “The Third Mediation Room” in Beijing (Disan tiaojie shi) and 
“Feelings at Eight O’Clock” in Changsha (Qinggan badianzhong). In fact, by early 2011 there 
were already thirty eight TV mediation shows being broadcast regularly by thirty four local TV 
stations and four provincial satellite networks. And these mediation shows generally seem to do 
very well in the ratings. Many of them, such as “The New Family Mediator,” “Gold Medal 
Mediation” (Jiangxi Satellite TV) and “Xiao Guo Runs Errands” (Xiao Guo paotui, on Shanxi 
TV Science and Education Channel) are broadcast daily, given primetime slots right before or 
after the national CCTV Evening News (which is shown on most channels), and then repeated 
twice each day. According to one estimate, these three shows were watched by 21.15%, 15.10%, 
and 12.63% of the regular viewing audience respectively in 2011 (Feng 2011).  
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Though we have mainly focused on the characteristics of NFM, which is probably still 
the best known and most influential Chinese TV mediation show, we should also note some of 
the more recent variations and new trends that have emerged among competing shows. While not 
fundamentally altering the basic approach to resolving social conflicts outlined above, some of 
these shows do position themselves in different markets, attempting to appeal to broader 
audiences, and they resolve other kinds of conflicts than those that predominate on NFM. Our 
observations are based on monitoring several of these shows in the years 2012 and 2013. In 
particular, we focus on “Gold Medal Mediation” from Jiangxi Satellite TV (hereafter GMM), 
currently the second most popular mediation show, which introduces a modified formula 
influenced by the People’s Mediation Law. 
 First, most of these TV mediation shows are predominantly oriented towards domestic 
and neighbourhood disputes in their local communities. By focusing on highly specific local 
issues and neighbourhood concerns, which they can deal with more authoritatively than non-
local TV stations, they consciously seek to boost their ratings among local audiences. This 
feature also allows the TV stations to seek the cooperation of various local government bureaus 
to achieve their “common goal” of “building a harmonious society.” The “positive” social 
influence and impact of mediation shows are then acknowledged by local governments, and they 
are willing to provide both material and symbolic support (such as official endorsements, case 
materials, and professional advice). This in turn adds weight to the decisions of the mediators on 
the shows, and increases their authority in the eyes of disputants and viewers. Local governments 
and courts also benefit from these shows, as they constantly remind ordinary people with 
interpersonal disputes that mediation outside the court is generally preferable to lawsuits or 
petitions (Liang 2010).  
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GMM has taken cooperation with local government, courts, and professional practitioners 
a step further by requiring the disputing parties to publicly sign a formal Mediation Agreement 
(tiaojie xieyishu), which records the terms of their settlement on the show and is witnessed by a 
jury of experts in the studio and thousands of TV viewers. Unlike the typical oral agreement 
between the parties in NFM, we see here formal legal documents, stamped with official seals 
bearing the names of the local bureau of justice and the TV station. By doing this, the producers 
want to ensure that the results of the TV mediation are legally binding on the parties, and that 
they will pay more than just “lip service” to the power and authority of the media and its official 
sponsors. They are also following the letter of the law, which requires such written agreements to 
be signed by the parties and sealed by the mediator after any successfully concluded mediation 
(People’s Mediation Law, article 29). 
Second, in order to attract viewers, these mediation shows have clearly borrowed 
techniques from other reality and entertainment TV genres to dramatize their presentation of the 
cases and appeal to viewers. For example, GMM begins with an attention-grabbing introduction 
to the core dispute accompanied by dramatic music reminiscent of an action movie. In the 
August 15, 2011, episode, a voiceover commentator asks an enticing question: why have two 
neighbours who were good friends for so many years now grown to hate each other?7 This 
commentary is followed by clips of emotional outbursts from the upcoming show, including an 
angry woman declaring that her neighbour has “betrayed” her. Only after this introduction do we 
get down to the details of the dispute. Some shows are filmed in peoples’ homes or in local 
                                                          




community centres, and they take questions directly from people on the street, such as “Xiao 
Guo Runs Errands.” Others utilize voting mechanisms similar to talent shows to recruit new 
mediators, such as “Loving Heart Mediation” (Aixin tiaojie) from Henan, or they set up a debate 
between panel members to decide some of the cases, such as “Black vs. White Observation 
Room” (Heibai guanchashi) from Jilin. All these features are designed to engage viewers and 
provide a fresh approach in hopes of increasing their ratings. 
Third, in terms of their mediation techniques, the more recent shows have increasingly 
emphasized their “modern scientific” approach to mediation, in contrast to the earlier emphasis 
on the mediator’s life experience and earthy folk wisdom exemplified by “Auntie” Bai Wanqing.  
For example, in GMM, besides the  so-called “gold medal mediator” Hu Jianyun, a university 
professor with long experience as a student counsellor, the show also involves eight expert 
“observers” (guancha yuan) drawn from among local lawyers, psychiatrists, police officers, 
teachers, and other professionals who are asked to provide analysis and professional advice 
throughout the mediation. Other shows also incorporate psychological games and analysis to get 
the participants to understand what is really driving their interpersonal conflicts, which adds both 
modern appeal and an aura of professional credibility to the process.8 
Fourth, and related to the previous two points, recent shows have attempted to expand 
their audiences to include a broader demographic of viewers. Initially, the typical viewers of 
mediation shows – unlike say talent contests or dating shows – were less educated, less affluent, 
older middle-aged people and seniors. According to one survey carried out in 2011, 33% of the 
                                                          
8 For example, both GMM and “The Third Mediation Room” (Beijing TV) have psychologists 
on their regular expert panels. 
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viewers of mediation shows were between 45 and 54 years old, 25% between 55 and 64, and 
20% over 65. In other words, almost 80% of the viewers were over 45 years old. Also female 
viewers constituted 57% of typical audiences (Feng 2011).  
While TV stations are certainly committed to retaining this steady and loyal viewership, 
they have worked to attract the interest of younger viewers as well, especially the post-1980s 
generation, by increasingly addressing their major concerns, such as career worries, romantic 
relationships, and problems with in-laws. One effective approach has been to broadcast shows 
online and add microblog sites (weibo), thereby utilizing new forms of social media that allow 
urban youth to interact with mediators and with each other in their own distinctive ways.9 In one 
recent show on GMM (4 August 2012), the topic was an internet relationship between a married 
woman and another man, which her husband strongly objected to, leading to incidents of 
domestic violence. In the middle of the show, the married couple’s son sent a text message to his 
parents (which was posted up on the TV screen) saying that he was disgusted with both of them 
for their selfishness, and wanted to leave home. With episodes like these, the shows (and their 
official sponsors) can target their “moral teachings” about social harmony towards younger 
viewers who will later become the “backbone” of society. 
Fifth, all these mediation shows contain very strong doses of moral teaching, sometimes 
directed at the disputing parties and sometimes at the broad mass of viewers. In most cases, 
morality is expected to trump or at least modify simple legal rights, and participants who 
selfishly insist on their rights will usually receive a very public dressing-down by one or more 
                                                          




observers. For example, in the 15 August 2011 episode of GMM, a railway worker had helped 
his neighbour (the son of his good friend) to purchase a subsidized apartment from their state 
work unit back in 1997. The neighbour paid for the property, but to obtain the fully subsidized 
price, he had to get the railway worker to put his name on the registration certificate. In 2006, the 
neighbour attempted to sell the property, but by that time the railway worker had died, and his 
wife (Mrs. Yang) refused to sign the property transfer certificate, claiming that the property now 
belonged to her through inheritance.  
Though this was a valid legal argument, the assembled observers on the show appealed to 
Mrs. Yang’s sense of moral decency: one observer pointed out that her husband had acted in a 
truly selfless way by helping her neighbour to buy the apartment, and surely her husband would 
not want her to get into a bitter dispute with her neighbours about it after he died. Another 
observer, a judicial official, identified three aspects of the case: under the law, he said, the 
property belonged to Mrs. Yang; but in terms of morality (daode), knowing of her husband’s 
arrangement with the Dings, it would not be right for Mrs. Yang to claim the property back; and 
finally, based on human feelings (ganqing), it would be better to keep on good terms with her 
neighbours rather than ruining their relationship with this dispute. Two other observers then took 
the other side: they criticized the neighbour for causing this dispute in the first place by trying to 
get a petty advantage instead of paying the full price for the property, and for selling the 
apartment to someone else without first getting Mrs. Yang’s consent. Anyone with even the 
slightest legal knowledge should have realized that property disputes will occur if you don’t have 
a valid ownership certificate. Finally, the mediator encouraged the parties to settle their 
differences, reminding them that a lawsuit would be extremely complicated and time-consuming. 
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There appears to be a ritual of public shaming going on here, designed to exert social and peer 
pressure on disputants to “do the right thing.”  
Similarly, when the parties come to an amicable settlement, the mediator and 
commentator usually draw a broader moral from the story. By contrast, if the parties fail to agree, 
which does happen occasionally, the commentator will emphasize how unhappy they are in their 
present conflict, and how it is ruining their interpersonal relationships and poisoning their lives. 
Clearly these shows are trying to prove their worth as morally edifying public “edutainment” 
programs, as opposed to socially divisive, tabloid-style reality shows. 
The other interesting aspect of the moral teaching in these shows is its strongly traditional, 
even Confucian, character. Individualistic insistence on rights and self interest is discouraged, 
but in its place we do not see a revival of Communist values; instead there is constant affirmation 
of “family feeling,” “brotherly love,” and “filial behaviour.” We discussed the first two of these 
“Confucian” values when analysing the episodes from NFM earlier, but the idea of filial 
behaviour also frequently appears in disputes between parents and their grown-up children. In 
one recent episode of GMM, a middle-aged son refused to let his mother move back in with him 
after a dispute because she wanted his “lazy” younger brother to come with her and freeload off 
him. One of the observers strongly criticized the son: “As a man, you should be filial and act like 
a good son, but … your mother keeps shaking her head and weeping as she listens to you. If 
she’s not comfortable, can you say you are being filial? … And after your mother cut off your 
phone service because she thought it was too expensive, you retaliated by cutting off the 
electricity in the house [thus forcing her to move out] … Can’t you see she is your own mother! 
How can you claim you are being filial?” In response, the son quotes a classical Chinese saying: 
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“I understand very well that ‘among the hundred virtues, being filial comes first.’10 But I have 
been filial: there are six people in this family [including my mother], and I have fed them all!” 
(GMM, 16 October 2012) 
At the same time, law does also play an important, if subordinate, role on these shows, 
particularly GMM. Most episodes include discussions of the legal rights of the parties, often with 
lawyers or legal experts providing opinions on the parties’ chances of success in a court of law. 
Viewers could learn a great deal about current Chinese legal principles relating to contracts, 
property rights, family law, and wills and estates from watching such mediation shows regularly. 
Yet generally the law is used either as a stick to encourage both sides to compromise, or as an 
inferior option when viewed from the perspective of morality and social harmony. For example, 
in the GMM episode on the neighbours’ dispute above, the lawyer and the mediator both warned 
Mrs. Yang how difficult it would be to get a quick and fair resolution of her case in a court, even 
though she had a clear legal right of ownership over the property. Likewise, in the NFM dispute 
involving the battling brothers, even though the eldest brother had the legal right to demand the 
sale of their apartment and a division of the proceeds, Bai Wanqing urged him to think of the 
hardship this would cause his younger brother and family. The implication is that in most of 
these disputes, following the letter of the law would only lead to injustice and the destruction of 
community and family relationships.     
 
                                                          
10 Saying attributed to Wang Yongbin (1792-1869), but obviously influenced by Confucian texts, 
such as the Han dynasty Classic of Filial Piety: “Of all the actions of man there is none greater 




Clearly, mediation shows offer a promising solution for television producers attempting 
to walk the narrow path between entertainment and education, between sensational tabloid 
stories and moral teaching, and between high ratings (translating to high profits) and official 
censorship. Local governments, especially departments of civil affairs, justice, and propaganda, 
have also found such shows extremely valuable and effective for disseminating the message of 
social harmony and helping to defuse social conflicts at the family and neighbourhood level. 
Since the PRC People’s Mediation Law was introduced in 2010, this trend of promoting a 
mixture of legal awareness and moral education to resolve disputes out of court has become even 
more conspicuous. The various social agents involved in TV mediation have steadily guided the 
genre to become a kind of Oprah Show meets Judge Judy with Chinese characteristics: a public 
stage where a combination of socialist “people’s mediators,” traditional family mediators, 
modern therapists, and legal advisors scrutinize the problems of a “troubled population,” instil 
“correct” and “moral” codes of individual and inter-personal behaviour, and provide a “valuable 
social service” in building a “harmonious society” (Zhu 2011). 
But do these reality TV mediation shows provide an effective and useful dispute 
resolution forum for their intended subjects: ordinary Chinese people with disputes and 
grievances? For those who appear on the show, the majority certainly end up with what appear to 
be voluntary settlement agreements. Yet among the shows reviewed for this paper, only GMM 
makes it clear that these are legally binding written agreements; other shows like NFM use 
language like “the parties have promised before the broad masses of viewers,” but do not show 
them actually signing any documents. So after the bright lights of the TV studio are turned off, it 
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is not clear whether the parties will actually fulfil their promises, and what kind of legal force 
their promises will have.  
Even assuming the resolutions on these shows are binding, they make up only a tiny 
proportion of disputes in China. With thirty eight mediation shows currently broadcasting, and 
assuming that each show mediates approximately 180 disputes each year (based on the average 
number mediated by NFM), this would mean a total of around 6800 disputes resolved on 
television annually. This is only a tiny proportion of the 6.5 million or so civil cases that passed 
through Chinese courts in 2011 (SPC 2012), or the 7.67 million disputes that were mediated by 
people’s mediators outside the courts in 2009 (Xinhua 2010).     
Nevertheless, even if only small numbers of viewers can have their disputes resolved on 
television, there are many other mediation forums available to them, some of which have been 
set up as spinoffs from reality TV shows. With the success of NFM, for example, and building 
on Bai Wanqing’s reputation as someone who could help ordinary people resolve their 
intractable problems, in October 2008, the Jing’an District Bureau of Justice “gave substantial 
support” to Bai to set up a “Bai Wanqing Mediation Studio” which hired 18 mediators as regular 
staff and also retained two law firms to provide regular legal advice on disputes (Jin 2011). And 
there are approximately 4.9 million other people’s mediators available throughout China for 
disputants to choose from (Xinhua 2010).  
Rather than viewing television mediation as an effective alternative dispute resolution 
forum in itself, therefore, perhaps we should see it more as an effective illustration to potential 
disputants of the benefits and possible drawbacks of choosing mediation over litigation.  
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In terms of the benefits, viewers can learn a great deal about everyday legal issues from 
watching these shows, gain a clear sense of the kinds of disputes that may be more suitable for 
mediated settlements, and become more aware of the complexity behind many apparently simple 
interpersonal conflicts. Those involved in disputes may also realize that mediation can be a much 
more cost-effective option than litigation.  
In terms of the drawbacks, although there is no coercion of disputants to accept 
unreasonable settlements on these shows, many cases leave viewers with a feeling that the 
voluntary agreement is unsatisfactory and will be short-lived. For example, in the case of the 
battling brothers, they live together in over-cramped conditions because of unaffordable property 
prices (from which the government and its largely state-owned developers have been the main 
beneficiaries); and also because one of the brothers was laid off after the government’s 
“restructuring” of state-owned enterprises in the 1990s, which led to the loss of his subsidized 
housing and the breakdown of his marriage. What is the “solution” offered by NFM in this kind 
of situation? Simply to tell the elder brother not to insist on his “legal right” to sell the apartment, 
because that will put his younger brother and the brother’s fiancée and teenage daughter out on 
the street, unable to afford a place to live themselves. So even though the younger brother 
apparently caused extensive damage to the elder brother’s room, which will cost a lot to repair, 
they are now supposed to put “family feelings” before “individual interests” for the sake of some 
abstract ideal of a “harmonious society.” Though on the show the brothers shook hands and 
agreed to accept this compromise, one wonders how long their new-found “harmony” and 
“family feeling” will last in their cramped, stress-filled living conditions. Presumably this 
necessity of making the best of a bad situation is common among non-televised mediations too. 
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The other major drawback of television mediation shows is that in order to retain the 
support of local governments and justice bureaus, they must carefully avoid any disputes where 
the defendants are themselves local government officials or state institutions. Yet this is not 
unique to television mediation. As we noted earlier, Chinese courts do not have the authority to 
satisfactorily adjudicate lawsuits against powerful state officials and institutions (cf. Wu 2013: 
116-29). And people’s mediators off screen would also find it very difficult to facilitate fair 
agreements between citizen complainants and state-supported defendants.  
One would think that television mediation shows would be an ideal platform for 
publicizing the benefits of “grand mediation” – the coordinated effort among courts, government 
departments, and mediation committees to resolve major social disputes before they escalate into 
popular protest. But presumably television stations, which are themselves state-owned, are not 
keen to focus on such major disputes, since most involve allegations of abuse of power by the 
state or its agents.  
Thus, despite the claims of their producers and sponsors that they are helping to bring 
about a “harmonious society,” in many cases it is not clear that TV mediation shows can do more 
than paper over some of the cracks in Chinese society with a thin veneer of harmonious rhetoric, 
and occasionally a minor adjustment of resources to slightly lessen the burdens of the poorest 
members of society. The central problem is that many family, neighbourhood and social disputes 
in China are caused by the unfair allocation of resources and the continuing harmful 
consequences of unjust or poorly executed past and present government policies, not to mention 
widespread official corruption.  
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The fact that so many interpersonal disputes and conflicts are continually emerging, not 
to mention much more serious demonstrations and protests throughout the country (some 
180,000 reported “mass incidents” in 2010 alone, based one Chinese estimate: Sun 2011) 
indicates that the roots of social injustice are not being addressed. Instead, the Chinese 
government prefers to focus on the tips of the branches: placing the burden of reform on ordinary 
people, and urging them to behave in a more moral and harmonious way. As Abel puts it, 
informal institutions treat “all conflict as individually caused and amenable to individual 
solutions”; they “disorganize” grievants, trivialize their grievances, and frustrate collective 
responses, making it seem “unnecessary to question basic social structures” (Abel 1982: 6-7). 
This has been the main thrust of the CCP’s propaganda campaigns in recent years, and this is 
why the official censors are so concerned to restrict “controversial” television shows and replace 
them with mediation shows and other on-screen offerings that loudly proclaim the benefits of 
social harmony. But in the long term, only a more representative political environment and a 
fairer allocation of resources through reforms to the tax and social welfare systems will provide 
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